CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 5 September 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco)

GE.95-63636 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 717th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representative of China, Ambassador Sha. I therefore give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Sha.

Mr. SHA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, may I begin by warmly congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese delegation is convinced that with your outstanding talent and rich experience in multilateral diplomacy, with your dedication and enthusiasm for the cause of disarmament, you are sure to guide this Conference to progress and success, thus contributing to international peace and security. I would like to assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I would also like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessors, the distinguished ambassadors from Mongolia, Mexico and Japan, for their tremendous efforts and achievements during their respective terms of office.

Nineteen ninety-five is a year full of special meanings. This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the world anti-fascist war and victory in the war to combat Japanese aggression against China, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, the most universal international organization in the world, as well as the fiftieth anniversary of the use of the nuclear weapon, the first use of the greatest weapon of mass destruction in human warfare. People all over the world, while commemorating these events, are reflecting upon history and drawing lessons from past experience. Likewise, the Chinese people have also held series of commemorative activities in order to "review and learn", to educate the Chinese people, especially the young, so that future generations will forever remember that "fire and blood" chapter in our history and strive for a strong and prosperous China and for world peace.

On 2 September 1945, the Japanese Government signed the instrument of surrender. 3 September thus became V-Day for both the Chinese people's war of resistance against Japanese aggression and the world anti-fascist war. That day is a day of triumph for the peoples of China as well as other countries in the world, a day to mark the end of a war of aggression which had brought mankind unprecedented suffering in the twentieth century. It is also a day leading us towards new and peaceful days of progress. August and glorious, that day has forever been inscribed both in Chinese and in world history.

The Japanese militarists had long sought to annex China. Since the latter half of the last century, Japan had joined other imperialist Powers in carving up the territory of China. For over 70 years after the Meiji Restoration, Japan had launched and participated in a series of aggressive wars, the majority of them against China. Japan invaded Taiwan in 1874 and provoked the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. Taiwan was occupied by Japan from 1895 and was subject to Japanese colonial rule for half a century. In 1931, Japan engineered the "18 September incident" and in 1935 the North China Incident, with its ambition to swallow up China ever growing.

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On 7 July 1937, the Japanese aggressors bombarded Wanping and attacked Lugouqiao (Marco Polo) bridge, thus starting a full-scale war against China in an attempt to subject the whole of China to its colonial rule.

The Japanese war of aggression inflicted untold suffering and damage unprecedented in scale on the Chinese people. According to incomplete statistics, 35 million Chinese were killed or wounded by the Japanese aggressors. In the notorious Nanjing massacre alone, more than 300,000 people were killed. Well over 2 million labourers who were fraudulently recruited inside Shanhaiguan Pass to be taken to north-east China died of maltreatment and torture. In addition, the Japanese invaders also resorted to germ and chemical warfare. Based on the 1937 exchange rate, the Japanese aggressors caused direct economic losses of US$ 100 billion, and indirect losses of US$ 500 billion to China. The crimes committed by the Japanese aggressors against the Chinese people represent the most barbarous and most brutal page in history.

The eight-year-long Chinese war against the Japanese aggression was an important part of the world anti-fascist war. Since the Opium War in 1840, China had been subjected time and again to aggression, bullying, humiliation and exploitation by imperialist Powers. Time and again the Chinese people rose against oppression and fought for national liberation. All ended in failure. The war against Japanese invasion was the first national liberation war waged by the Chinese people against foreign invaders in modern history that ended in complete victory. United by shared hatred, an unyielding and indomitable spirit, the poorly armed Chinese people fought against and defeated the much better-equipped and economically strong enemy, thereby creating the miracle of a semi-colonial and weak nation defeating an imperialist Power, wiping out the humiliations of a century. As our late Chairman Mao Zedong pointed out, it was "a wonder in the history of war, a heroic undertaking of the Chinese people and an epoch-making triumph".

To review history is to understand it in a proper perspective and to draw due lessons from it, thus avoiding a repetition of history. Only by remembering historical lessons, sincerely repenting of its criminal acts of aggression and persisting in following the road of peaceful development can Japan gain the understanding and trust of the Asian peoples and the international community as a whole and prevent repetitions of historic tragedies.

The atrocities inflicted upon the Chinese people were caused by the war of aggression by Japanese imperialism and militarism. Like the Chinese people, the people of Japan were also victims of that war. The Chinese delegation wishes to take this opportunity to express its deep sympathy for the over 200,000 innocent civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who were killed by the atomic attack and its appreciation of the anti-nuclear-weapon sentiment of the Japanese people for the last 50 years. Like the Chinese and other Asian peoples, the people of Japan were innocent victims of a small group of militarists in Japan. We sincerely hope, however, that today when we commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all of us can understand the true cause of that unfortunate event

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and, what is more important, draw proper lessons from it. We cannot but wonder at the attitude and intention of such a course of action: elaborately describing oneself as a victim while deliberately covering up or writing off one's own crime of bringing atrocities to peoples of other countries; talking about the destructiveness of atomic bombing but without saying a word as to its cause; and preaching about the significance of a nuclear test ban while keeping silent on one's enjoyment of the protection of someone else's nuclear umbrella and one's support for a doctrine of nuclear deterrence founded on the possible use of nuclear weapons. The mayor of Hiroshima, Mr. Takashi Hiraoka, pointed out rightly in a recent article that the Hiroshima incident was not an isolated one and has to be understood in the context of history and the history of war. It should be understood both from the perspective of the victim and from that of the victimizer. The fact that Hiroshima suffered an atomic attack will not write off Japan's crimes of aggression. Unless Japan itself repents of its past record of war crimes, no matter how much is said about the atomic attack on Hiroshima, it will simply not find resonance in the hearts of the people of the world - the people of Asia in particular. The Chinese delegation finds wisdom in those words.

In the last 50 years, especially since the beginning of the 1990s, the world has gone through fundamental changes. With the end of the cold war and East-West confrontation, the nuclear Powers have started to embark on the course of nuclear disarmament. That is the background for the ongoing multilateral negotiations on the CTBT and the yet-to-start negotiations on the "cut-off" convention, and a reflection of the positive worldwide trend towards peace and development. On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the existence of such negative phenomena as hegemonism, power politics and doctrines of nuclear supremacy and deterrence, as well as frequent instances of interference with other countries' internal affairs, infringements of their sovereignty and undermining of their unity. In this international environment, the Chinese people have to live by the wisdom of "living in safety but thinking of danger", to redouble their efforts to promote peace, development and disarmament while working hard for their own economic prosperity at home.

It is a fact that China has not stopped nuclear testing and has conducted two underground tests so far this year. It is also a fact, however, that China has exercised the utmost restraint on nuclear testing and that the scale and number of its nuclear tests have been extremely limited. For decades, it has never been China that has held up negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. This is known to all. Not being superstitious about nuclear weapons, China has never joined the nuclear arms race. The small number of nuclear weapons it possesses are for the sole purpose of self-defence. We may recall that from the very first day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China unconditionally undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In addition, it also unconditionally undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Chinese Government is insistent that other nuclear-weapon States should respond to its call for early negotiations to conclude a no-first-use

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treaty and to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones in a legally binding international instrument. In fact, as early as 1985, at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Chinese Government put forward a proposal that the nuclear-weapon States, once they had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, should move on to negotiate an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. In the light of the changed international situation following the end of the cold war and the East-West confrontation, Qian Qichen, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of China, proposed at the forty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly the negotiation and conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons on the model of the ban on chemical and biological weapons. Unfortunately, for reasons known to all, such negotiations have yet to get under way. Recognizing and assessing positively the significance of the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the framework of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, China is now taking an active, responsible and constructive part in the current negotiations, with a view to concluding not later than 1996 a good, comprehensive, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty with universal participation banning all nuclear-weapon test explosions.

Being an independent and sovereign country, China has always opposed hegemonism and China itself will never practise it. China does not belong to any military alliance, nor does it enjoy the protection of any nuclear umbrella. It is true that China has never been a victim of a nuclear-weapon attack. Yet China has long been living under the shadow of the threat of nuclear weapons. While China will never invade other countries, it will never allow any country to encroach upon its sovereignty or territorial integrity or undermine its national unity. In so far as the countries concerned refuse to accept the above-mentioned proposals, China needs, for the sole purpose of self-defence, to possess a small number of nuclear weapons and to conduct an extremely limited number of nuclear tests. China has time and again stated that once the CTBT enters into force, it will cease nuclear testing. The Chinese delegation believes it improper and totally unacceptable for certain countries to point their fingers at China and make artificial issues out of a limited number of nuclear tests while those countries themselves are members of a military alliance, enjoying the protection of the nuclear umbrella of a certain nuclear super-Power and supporting the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

The CTBT negotiations have traversed one year and eight months. Despite the short lapse of time, the CTBT rolling text has been revised four times, and by the end of this session, the CD will submit a fifth revision to the General Assembly. The Chinese delegation rejoices at any progress achieved in the CTBT negotiations. The Chinese delegation is particularly satisfied with the substantive progress made at this session on the architecture of the IMS. The Chinese delegation knows full well that the CTBT is unprecedented. For the NTB Ad Hoc Committee to accomplish its mandate before the target of 1996, it will have to count on the participating countries' resolve to overcome all difficulties and continue their constructive efforts. The Chinese delegation

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remains convinced that so long as all parties concerned cherish genuine political will, the target of concluding the CTBT negotiations in 1996 is achievable. In this respect, I wish to take this opportunity to explain the position of the Chinese delegation on some important issues under consideration by the two working groups for the negotiation of the CTBT.

First, on the preamble of the CTBT and its entry into force, the Chinese delegation has put forward its own views and textual suggestions and listened attentively to the comments from other delegations. As the result of our own further study and to promote progress in the CTBT negotiations, the Chinese delegation is now ready to consider the reasonable suggestions from some delegations and proposes the following adjustments in the relevant texts.

Under the preamble, China agrees to replace the present text proposed by China on nuclear disarmament with the relevant reference from the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Furthermore, proceeding from our respect for the position of the non-parties to the NPT, China suggests deleting the reference to the NPT in the relevant paragraph.

Under the entry-into-force article, the Chinese delegation is ready to withdraw its proposed text stipulating that the participation of CD members is a condition for the entry into force of the CTBT.

The Chinese delegation will provide further detailed explanations when Working Group 2 discusses the relevant part of the rolling text.

Secondly, on CTBT verification issues - the international monitoring system and national technical means. The IMS will be a comprehensive monitoring system with global coverage, a system specially designed and established for the sole purpose of the CTBT. As such, the IMS will be the fundamental technical means to ensure the effective verification of the CTBT. The Chinese delegation believes that a sound and effective IMS will be sufficient to detect instances of non-compliance on a global scale. As the IMS will be established as the result of extensive negotiations and consensus and serve all future States parties, it will not only embody the principle of equality amongst all States parties, but also prevent the inevitable inequality and discrimination resulting from disparities among States parties in their levels of national technical means for monitoring.

The Chinese delegation recognizes that all sovereign States are entitled to develop their own technical means for the purpose of conducting activities within the scope of their sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Chinese delegation believes that to ensure that the international verification regime is objective, no NTM should be allowed to find a place in the IMS and no country should be allowed to substitute its own NTM for the IMS. It is unacceptable to any country that believes in sovereign equality that one country or a number of countries should take advantage of their exclusive NTM and monopolize international verification in disregard of the IMS with a self-assumed mandate as a "world police". We may ask, if we have no faith and trust in the IMS even at the time of the negotiation, why should we bother

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creating such a system? On the other hand, it is well known to all that as NTMs are under national control, it will be up to the State concerned to decide what monitoring data to provide and how. Therefore, NTMS are inherently selective, arbitrary and subjective. The institutionalization of NTM in the CTBT would be tantamount to legalizing the ability of one State party or a small group of States parties with superior technical means to police the world, conduct all kinds of activities, including espionage, against other States parties and keep watch over the majority of States parties that do not have such means. This would make the CTBT a truly discriminatory international treaty and its verification would unavoidably involve abuse. For the above reason, the Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate here that China will not accept the integration of NTM into the CTBT verification regime and will not accept the triggering of an OSI by NTM data or "any other information".

As to the purpose of OSI, the Chinese delegation is of the view that the primary issue in discussing OSI under the CTBT is to clearly define the purpose of such an undertaking and then proceed to the question of procedures and technologies. Without a clearly defined purpose, OSI would lack guidance and criteria. China believes that the sole purpose of an OSI is to identify whether or not an ambiguous event detected by the IMS was a nuclear-weapon test explosion carried out in violation of the scope of the CTBT and conducted after the entry into force of the treaty and, to the extent possible, to attribute the event to a violator. Needless to say, the on-site activities carried out by the inspection team must accord with the purpose of OSI and be conducted in a minimally intrusive, highly cost-effective and timely manner in order to accomplish the sole task of collecting evidence regarding whether or not a nuclear test has taken place within the inspection area. Once the evidence has been obtained, the inspection should be considered accomplished, and if no "smoking gun" is found, the inspected party should then be cleared of any alleged acts of non-compliance with the treaty.

Turning to the OSI triggering mechanism, the Chinese delegation believes that the process of consultation and clarification is a mandatory step before the triggering of an OSI. The IMS is the main organ of the international verification regime for the CTBT and consultation and clarification is an important measure for the settlement of disputes among States parties. An OSI itself is not a routine inspection but the last resort following an inconclusive process of consultation and clarification. In this respect, consultation and clarification, if properly conducted, will drastically reduce the occurrence of OSI. In the light of the importance and political sensitivity of OSI and the serious damage that could result from its abuse, the issue of OSI must be treated with caution and an OSI triggered only after a two thirds majority of all the members of the Executive Council have cast their affirmative vote, i.e. by way of a "green light".

The CD has succeeded in negotiating and concluding the CWC and it will be equally successful in negotiating and concluding the CTBT. The delegates of various countries participating in the negotiations bear on their shoulders not only the mission to safeguard their legitimate national interests but also the task of preserving the common interests of the international community.

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The Chinese delegation will continue to contribute to the best of its ability towards the conclusion of a good CTBT which will help enhance the security of all countries and bring about early realization of the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Sha for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair. Do other delegations wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to the Ambassador of Japan, Mrs. Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): The distinguished Ambassador of China, in his statement, referred to past history. Since the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Murayama, made a clear statement on this issue on 15 August, I do not see any need to repeat it here, since I believe that this is a forum to negotiate future international legal regimes in the field of disarmament. Japan has been advocating consistently a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and it has been against any nuclear testing by any country. I believe that it is not only the wish of Japan but also the wish of the international community as a whole to realize a world without any nuclear explosion and, eventually, a world free from any nuclear weapons. I would like to take this opportunity to express once again the strong wish of Japan for the early conclusion and early entry into force of a CTBT.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Japan for her statement. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? If not, I wish to inform you that I would like to submit to the Conference for approval at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, 14 September the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 of the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the detection and identification of seismic events, document CD/1341, relating to the dates of the next two sessions of the Group of Experts, namely from 27 November to 1 December 1995 and from 12 to 23 February 1996.

As I said at the last plenary meeting, I have been intensively continuing my consultations on the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. On concluding these consultations, I prepared a draft decision on the issue which I submitted for consideration by all groups. I firmly hope that this draft decision will constitute an acceptable basis for solving this problem, which everybody agrees is important and urgent. I would therefore like to appeal to all delegations to ensure that flexibility and a spirit of compromise prevail so that the Conference can take a decision at the next plenary meeting on Thursday, 14 September on this important issue. In any event the Chair is determined to achieve a solution, with cooperation from everyone and support from all delegations, to respond to the pressing recommendation from the United Nations General Assembly on this issue.

(The President)

I now turn to the informal paper distributed by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. This timetable was drawn up in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual it is merely indicative and can be changed if necessary. On that understanding I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before I adjourn this plenary meeting I would remind you that immediately afterwards we will be holding an informal meeting to study the technical parts of the draft annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. I would also like to inform you that starting next week i.e. as from Monday, 11 September, as I told you at the bilateral consultations and in the informal consultations, I will be conducting other bilateral consultations with all delegations on the work programme for the rest of the year 1995, and the preparations for 1996.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 14 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.